The popular perception of the existence of a straightforward alliance between Portugal and South Africa as a result of the growing efficacy of African nationalist groups during the 1960s and early 1970s has never been seriously questioned. However, new research into recently declassified documents from the Portuguese military archives and an extensive overview of the Portuguese and South African diplomatic records from that period provide a different perception of what was certainly a complex interaction between the two countries. It should be noted that, although the two countries viewed their close interaction as mutually beneficial, the existing political differences effectively prevented the creation of an open strategic alliance that would have had a greater deterrence value instead of the secretive tactical approach that was used by both sides to resolve immediate security threats. In addition, South African support for Portugal's long, difficult and costly counterinsurgency effort in three different operational theatres in Africa -Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau -was not really decisive since such support was never provided on a significant scale.
events that led to Brazil's independence. 1 The existing tension and differences regarding the acquisition and possession of colonial territories in Africa culminated in the British Ultimatum of 1890, 2 a development that had a profound political impact in Portugal.
The Portuguese viewed the creation of the Union of South Africa as an affirmation of Britain's interests in Southern Africa. In addition, there were other events that strengthened Portuguese perceptions about the Union's probable intentions towards Portugal's African territories. During the First World War, Jan Smuts had formulated a secret memorandum that propagated the idea of the incorporation of part of the Portuguese territories in Africa into the Union of South Africa. 3 Portuguese fears of possible expansionism on the part of the Union were clearly expressed by Norton de Matos who was Angola's Governor General from 1912 until 1915 and Angola's High Commissioner from 1921 until 1923. Matos believed that the objectives of the regional policies of the Union were territorial expansion and the creation of a United States of South Africa. 4 He also believed that the Afrikaners were willing to extend their influence in the African continent as far as the equator.
5
In addition to the concerns about the possible territorial expansion of the Union in Southern Africa, senior Portuguese officials also expressed scepticism when confronted with explanations referring to the Union's segregation policies. During a visit to the Union in 1922, the Portuguese High Commissioner in Mozambique, Dr Manuel de Brito Camacho, expressed the view that the strict segregation policy that was followed in the Union would not succeed in the long term since the black population would always be substantially larger than the white population. 6 The Union's black population would gradually become more educated and developed and it would increasingly reject the colour bar.
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During the next few decades, prominent Portuguese officials continued to criticise the Union's racial policies. During the 1950s, Professor Silva Cunha from the Portuguese Higher Institute of Overseas Studies emphasised that the Union's racial policies were profoundly unjust and illogical. 8 He believed that it was not possible to prevent the interaction between two racial groups, especially economic interaction. 9 Professor Silva Cunha became Deputy Secretary of State for Overseas
Administration in 1962 and Minister of the Overseas Provinces in 1965, a position that he retained until 1973.
Despite Portuguese concerns about the Union's possible territorial ambitions in Southern Africa -which were expressed quite clearly after the First World War -as well as irreconcilable approaches to race relations, the two sides managed to reach agreements in the economic sphere quite early. One of the success stories was the construction of the railway line that linked Lourenço Marques to the mining towns in the Transvaal. 10 Another factor that brought the two sides together was the use of Mozambican labourers in the Kimberley diamond mines, which started soon after the 1870s. 11 The First and Second World Wars also had an impact on the relationship between the two countries. Both Portugal and South Africa acknowledged the need to maintain a policy of good neighbourliness in order to safeguard their respective security interests.
Despite the apparent willingness to maintain a policy of good neighbourliness during and after the Second World War, there were substantial differences between the two sides regarding possible tighter cooperation in the defence sphere. Portugal participated in the African Defence Facilities Conference, which was held in Nairobi in August 1951. In addition to the Portuguese delegates, the other delegates came from Belgium, Ethiopia, France, Italy, Southern Rhodesia as well as the United 6 B. Camacho, Gente Bóer -Aspectos D'Africa. Livraria Editora Guimarães. Lisboa 1930, pp.28-227. 7 Kingdom and South Africa. 12 The aim of the conference was to secure an agreement "on the facilities that would be required for the movement of troops and military supplies on the lines of communication between the South of Africa and the Middle East in time of war or emergency". 13 A secret report written to the Union's Department of External Affairs at the end of the Nairobi Conference in August 1951 describes Portuguese attitudes during the negotiations on possible defence arrangements on the African continent. Although there was a willingness to cooperate, rigid instructions from Lisbon tended to hamper the process. 14 Moreover, the Portuguese "were extremely sensitive in regard to any proposals affecting their national sovereignty and there was evidence of their familiar suspicions of the ultimate motives and intentions of South Africa".
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The complex South African-Portuguese interaction during the 1960s
The anti-Portuguese uprising that started in northern Angola in 1961 took both the Portuguese and the South African authorities by surprise. The scale of the violence and the high number of deaths caused serious concern in both countries. 16 From a Portuguese perspective, the main drawback was the limited strength of the Portuguese Armed Forces and Portugal's limited economic and financial resources. Moreover, the size of Portugal's African territories made it very difficult to coordinate logistics, especially after insurgencies broke out in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau in addition to Angola. At the end of 1961, the Portuguese also had to deal with the loss of Goa when 45 000 Indian troops attacked and overwhelmed the 3 500 Portuguese troops who had been deployed in that Portuguese-held territory.
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In the meantime, the initial South African response was that Portugal would not be able to withstand the attacks against its presence in Africa. South African Consul General in Luanda, CBH Fincham, expressed the view that the Portuguese military was ill equipped to deal with the rebellion in northern Angola since the insurgents were able to attack small towns with impunity. 18 Fincham was convinced that Angola would become an independent country within one or two years since the Portuguese government in Lisbon seemed unable to come up with any innovative solution to resolve Angola's problems. 19 South African newspapers also noted the success of the Indian invasion of Goa and its potential impact on the African continent. In December 1961, an article in the Rand Daily Mail predicted the intensification of violent opposition against Portugal in Africa as a result of the success of the Indian invasion of Goa. 20 Earlier in that same year, The
Star indicated that the average South African was perplexed to see Portugal -the poorest of the European colonial powers -"marshalling all her scant metropolitan resources" for the defence of Angola through the force of arms.
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While the South Africans had doubts about Portugal's ability to remain in Africa, the Portuguese authorities were not keen to be lumped together with South Africa -especially in the international arena -because of South Africa's racial policies. In November 1962, the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister, Franco Nogueira, told South Africa's Sunday Times that there were some "basic differences" between South Africa and Portugal. 22 Portugal viewed South Africa's apartheid policy as "morally wrong and politically dangerous" while South Africa viewed Portugal's racial policy "as morally dangerous and politically wrong". Nogueira rejected the possibility of a military agreement between Portugal and South Africa because "whatever may happen in Angola, in Lisbon's view, the moral condemnation of having to accept aid from South Africa would be too high a price to pay". 23 He later defended his views by telling the South African Ambassador in
Lisbon that he had told the Sunday Times that relations between South Africa and Portugal were excellent but that "even good neighbours sometimes had problems which with goodwill could easily be solved". • There were still some South African sectors that displayed what the document described as 'old attitudes' towards the African territories under Portuguese control. The Office of Political Affairs of the Portuguese Overseas Ministry claimed that it was aware of 'certain South African projects', which would be implemented should events on the ground force the Portuguese authorities to lose control of Angola and Mozambique. There was the perception that, if the Portuguese authorities had lost control of the situation in the two territories, the South Africans could possibly take over some parts of Angola and Mozambique.
• The white population in Angola and Mozambique was favourably disposed towards South Africa at a time when there were doubts about Portugal's capacity to deal with the ongoing rebellion in Angola. The deployment of South African military attachés could result in what the document called 'undesirable developments'. This implied that the Portuguese authorities suspected that the white population in Angola and Mozambique, would be more amenable towards South Africa if Portugal, was unable to guarantee the security of its African possessions.
• The development of a closer relationship with South Africa -especially on matters of 'mutual security' -should not be in the shape of a formal arrangement because African nationalist propaganda would be directed against Portugal as a result of South Africa's racial policy. Cooperation between Portugal and South Africa had to be less visible in order to avoid or reduce the potential of criticism.
• Although defence cooperation between Portugal and South Africa would boost the confidence of the white population in Angola and Mozambique, it could have the opposite effect on the black population. This could jeopardise Portuguese efforts to improve relations between different races on the basis of non-discrimination.
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The Portuguese Overseas Ministry emphasised that it was necessary to convince the South Africans that their security would not be affected by events in Angola and Mozambique. It was also advisable to keep the South Africans "reasonably informed" of developments in the two territories. It would be best if South African military attachés were deployed in the Portuguese capital, Lisbon. One of the attachés would be allowed to travel to Angola on long trips, provided he moved around under Portuguese supervision. In Mozambique, such visits would have to be less frequent and of short duration. villages under attack in south-eastern Angola. Moreover, South African helicopters were used in the pursuit of groups of insurgents who were fleeing from the security forces while Portuguese aircraft provided protection for the South African aircraft operating in Angola. In addition, Portuguese aircraft were responsible for directing fire onto the assigned targets that were being attacked. 65 From the perspective of the South African Defence Force, the operations in south-eastern Angola -which included the participation of both Portuguese and South African military personnelserved not only to disrupt SWAPO's efforts to infiltrate South West Africa but they also enabled South African pilots and air force crews to gain combat experience in a real operational theatre.
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It is clear that from 1968 onwards, senior Portuguese military officers appeared to be more willing to accept South African support in southern Angola. In November 1968, the General Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces, General Venâncio Augusto Deslandes, instructed the Portuguese security forces in Angola to allow the South African police to conduct rapid "hot pursuit" operations in Angolan territory if there was a need to stop groups of insurgents that might threaten South West Africa. 67 The only condition was that the South African police had to inform the Portuguese military authorities about its intention to pursue insurgents in Angolan territory. Moreover, South African police units could not be stationed inside Angola and they could only operate close to the border that separated the two territories. 68 Such a posture highlights the fact that, although the Portuguese authorities were prepared to allow some units of the South African police to conduct "hot pursuit" operations close to the border, they still had reservations about the presence of South African forces inside Angolan territory.
However, despite these measures SWAPO insurgents continued to move closer to South West Africa. In December 1968, General Fraser explained in a memorandum that SWAPO insurgents continued to cross over from Zambia into Angola's Rivungo and Luiana regions. 69 He said that, while the Portuguese had 65 Ibid. 66 the main reason why the Portuguese gave less attention to the infiltration of insurgents in south-eastern Angola was the fact that they had overextended their military capacity in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. Furthermore, the protection of northern Angola was viewed as a priority because that is where most of Angola's largest towns -including the territory's capital -were located. General Fraser's comments indicate that, despite the secret working relationship that developed between the military establishments of both countries, there was some tension about what would be the most appropriate strategy to deal with security threats. The main source of concern for South Africa's military establishment was the infiltration of SWAPO insurgents into northern South West Africa via southeastern Angola. In the meantime, the Portuguese had to deal with several immediate threats and they could not focus their attention in one particular area -in this case south-eastern Angola -when they had to handle many other security threats in three different operational theatres.
There was also an additional source of disagreement between the sides. During the late 1960s, the Portuguese authorities hinted at the possibility of obtaining a large loan from South Africa in order to help maintain control over Portugal's possessions in Southern Africa. In December 1968, Angola's Governor General told the South African Consul General in Luanda that the Portuguese Minister of Defence in Lisbon was preparing an overall request for assistance that would be delivered to the South African government. 72 According to the South African Consul
General, this package would comprise military and civil components and it would replace the piecemeal presentation of requests that had hitherto "characterized the Portuguese approach". 73 The Ministers of both countries first discussed the issue of In a letter to his Portuguese counterpart, Botha explained South Africa's position. 86 The loan would exclude obsolete military equipment to the value of R8.5 million, which would be granted free of charge. However, it would include new military equipment valued at R6.6 million that would be subtracted from the R25 million. 87 The remaining R18.4 million would be payable in gold. The R25 million loan package would have to be repaid over a twenty year period and repayments would commence five years after the loan was drawn. The South African authorities would also charge an annual interest fee of 4%. 88 Botha confirmed that South Africa would grant two helicopters to the Portuguese military forces in Angola, which would serve to replace two helicopters that had been lost in Angola. However, he made it clear that no more helicopters would be made available to the Portuguese military forces in future.
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In a letter to his South African counterpart on 27 May 1969, the Portuguese Minister of Defence, General Viana Rebelo, accepted the conditions put forward by PW Botha. 90 However, he indicated that he had always understood that South
Africa's response to the Portuguese request for assistance would translate itself into the cession of equipment worth R11 million plus the R50 million loan package, which would be payable in gold. 91 General Rebelo told PW Botha that he "became 83 Ibid. surprised with the actual resolution of your Cabinet to allow only 50% of that loan because of the expenses of the Cabora Bassa project". 92 He requested some changes to the repayment process of the loan, which PW Botha accepted.
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The tone of the negotiations indicated that the two sides did not fully agree on the financing of a strategy that could facilitate Portuguese efforts to contain the insurgencies in Portugal's African territories. Such a strategy was dependent on sustained financial capacity that eluded the much pressed Portuguese authorities. The disappointment expressed by senior Portuguese officials during the negotiations highlights the fact that the Portuguese authorities expected more from the South African government.
The use of secrecy and the inability to openly acknowledge Portuguese-South African cooperation
Within official governmental circles there was little support for a more open approach, which could give the public a clearer glimpse on how the two countries interacted during a difficult period of the Cold War. This was especially the case of how the Portuguese handled South African overt aid. The arduous counterinsurgency campaign that the Portuguese were forced to conduct in Mozambique -a territory that shared a common border with South Africa -soon attracted the attention of individual South Africans who wanted to alleviate the difficulties faced by Portuguese soldiers in that territory. In September 1967, a wine producer in South Africa's Cape region, Bernard Podlashuk, set up the Mozambique Fighting Soldiers' Comfort Fund, 94 whose aim was to make a goodwill gesture by providing "small comforts to alleviate the fighting soldiers' endurance of terrible guerrilla warfare".
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In December 1967, at least fifteen South African aircraft took more than 3 500 Christmas parcels to Portuguese soldiers who had been deployed in northern Mozambique. 96 The next year, the Fund began to collect money to buy air ambulances for the Portuguese troops in Mozambique. 97 Two air ambulances were handed over to the Portuguese military authorities in Lourenço Marques at the end 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. The changes were that repayment of the loan should only commence at the end of the sixth year after the date on which the loan was drawn and that the 4% interest rate should be reduced to 3% per annum. Botha's reply and acceptance of these changes can be found in AHD, South African medical support would certainly help to alleviate the plight of many Portuguese soldiers who had been wounded during combat operations. However, a document from the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon dismissed any possibility of such collaboration ever taking place because of the political impact of such support. 101 The document indicated that the countries that were openly hostile to Portugal in the international arena would be able to exploit the issue of overt South African medical support. This was contrary to the secret nature of the relationship that existed between the two countries in the military and security spheres. The document explained that the opponents of Portugal's presence in Africa were already making use of every opportunity to highlight existing cooperation between Portugal and South Africa in various fields. As a result, it would not be in Portugal's best interests to allow such cooperation to take place even though the Portuguese military authorities in Mozambique did not have any objections in respect of South African medical support.
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The use of secrecy became the major tool to disguise the intentions of South African and Portuguese military planners. As a result, the two parties were always concerned with the breakdown of the rules of secrecy. In April 1970, the Portuguese Embassy in Pretoria sent a detailed report to the military authorities in Lisbon describing how several American diplomats in South Africa were trying to obtain 98 The Natal Mercury, 27 January 1969. The two light aircraft cost a total of R50 000. The funds to pay for the aircraft were collected in Natal and the Orange Free State. 99 The Star, 30 September 1968. 100 Ibid. 101 AHD, PAA M.1138: "África do Sul -Dádivas e auxílio às Forças Armadas Portuguesas em Combate": Document from Director General Coelho Lopes, Lisbon -General Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces, Lisbon, 11 November 1968. 102 Ibid.
information about the presence of South African military aircraft and South African military personnel in south-eastern Angola. The report -which was written by the Portuguese military attaché in Pretoria -emphasised that it was necessary to ensure the secrecy of the military collaboration between the two countries. 103 In the meantime, in August 1972, the South African Consul General in Luanda, EM Malone, expressed concern about the fact that a South African freelance journalist, SJR McIntosh, had obtained confidential information about the presence of South African military personnel in south-eastern Angola. 104 The concern that South African and Portuguese officials displayed about the disclosure of information indicated the fear of the political impact that such disclosures could have in the public arena. Portuguese diplomats, for example, were reluctant to accept the deployment of a large military mission in South Africa after the Portuguese government issued an official note indicating that a permanent Portuguese mission would be established in Pretoria at the beginning of 1974. 105 The mission would comprise one general and four lower ranking officers as well as a military interpreter and a military archivist. 106 The Portuguese ambassador in South Africa, Francisco Menezes Rosa, argued that the arrival of such a military contingent in Pretoria was bound to raise questions about the relationship between the two countries. 107 The Portuguese Ministry of Defence referred to the new Portuguese mission in South Africa as the "Alcora Missio"'. 108 In the recently declassified documents from Portugal's military archives, the Alcora Exercise is described as "the investigation of ways and means to establish a coordinated tripartite effort whose aim will be to counterbalance the common threat that is directed towards all the Alcora participants". 109 The participant countries were Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. The above-mentioned controversy indicates that there were differences of opinion between Portuguese diplomats and the Portuguese military. The core of the controversy was the issue of how to disguise the new military delegation so that it would not attract the attention of prying eyes.
The final phase of Portuguese-South African cooperation
Although it is difficult to make a precise assessment of the impact of South African support for the Portuguese military effort in Angola and Mozambique, it is clear that such support was by far never sufficient or broad enough to help change the course of the war in the former Portuguese territories. In 1974, the Portuguese had accumulated a total of 93 helicopters in Africa. 110 The vast majority of these helicopters were Alouette III helicopters. 111 way in which South Africans viewed Portuguese efforts to contain the insurgents in Angola. 119 He emphasised that South Africans spoke in a patronising manner about the Portuguese and wrongly believed that South Africans would do better if they were facing the same situation. 120 In February 1972, Malone said that it was crucial to examine the war in Angola as a whole, and resist the temptation of placing excessive attention on certain events merely because they occurred in areas close to "our own borders". 121 When he mentioned "our own borders", he was referring to insurgent activity near the border that separated Angola and South West Africa. He explained that the war would be lost or won in the northern and eastern regions of Angola and not in the south.
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Conclusion
Despite the fact that South Africa and Portugal were forced to move closer to one another as a result of the spread of African nationalism and an increasingly hostile international environment during the 1960s, the two countries did not really develop a common political approach that could effectively deal with the perceived threats against the status quo that they wanted to maintain. On the Portuguese side, there was a reluctance to accept a more public and open relationship with South Africa. According to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs in the early 1970s, Rui Patrício, Portugal would never allow South Africa's direct military intervention in Angola and Mozambique since the Portuguese did not want to compromise their principles. 123 Furthermore, Patrício confirmed that the Portuguese firmly believed that it was necessary to avoid what he called the "internationalization of the war", which could become a reality if South Africa became directly involved in the counter-insurgency efforts in Angola and Mozambique. He explained that the main objective of Portugal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to avoid any gesture that could lead to the escalation of the conflict in the three operational theatres. 124 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the South African authorities were increasingly concerned with how the conflict in Angola could affect South West Africa's northern regions. The focus of South Africa's limited support to the Portuguese in south-eastern Angola was to help prevent security threats in South West Africa. However, in terms of security, south-eastern Angola was not Portugal's main priority. The main concern of the Portuguese military was to ensure the effective control over all of Portugal's geographically vast and separate overseas territories in Africa and Asia. On the African continent, the Portuguese were trying to maintain full military control over three different operational theatres. At the end of 1973, Portugal's military establishment had deployed a total of 150 thousand men in the three operational theatres. 125 By that time, the Portuguese had been engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Africa for well over a decade. The Portuguese military lost 8 290 men in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.
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South African support could have helped to change the course of the war in the three operational theatres only if such support was made available on a vast and massive scale. This would have to include the provision of additional financial loans as well as the deployment of vast quantities of military equipment and substantial contingents of South African ground forces alongside the Portuguese military forces in the three operational theatres. There is nothing in the available declassified documentation in the Portuguese and South African archives to suggest that Portugal was willing to accept such large-scale South African support or that South Africa was prepared to provide massive aid to the Portuguese military establishment in Africa. What can be said about the relationship between the two countries from the end of the Second World War until 1974 is that it followed an uneven path that was marked by political considerations and self-interest on both sides. 125 Comissão para o Estudo das Campanhas de África, Resenha Histórico Militar das Campanhas de África (1961 Campanhas de África ( -1974 . Estado Maior do Exército, 1 Vol, 2 Edição Lisboa, p.259. 126 Ibid, p.246.
